Unfortunately, Airtable is what I would call a “relatively low-security” platform.
There are at least 9 security holes in the product that I am personally aware of:
All collaborators, even read-only collaborators, can duplicate an entire base into their own personal workspace.
All collaborators, even read-only collaborators, can export a CSV file of an entire table.
All collaborators, even read-only collaborators, can select all of the records in an entire table and press command-C to copy all of the table’s data with one click.
All collaborators, even read-only collaborators, are allowed to share the entire base with other people. Yes, they can only grant other people the same permissions that they currently have (or lower), but this is still a concern.
All collaborators, even read-only collaborators, can always view 100% of the fields, records, and tables in an entire base.
All blocks that depend on an API key to access an external service (such as the Google Maps block, the SendGrid email block, the Formstack Documents Block, the TypeForm block, etc.) expose your API key to anybody who uses your system, even a read-only user. With access to your API key, every user has unlimited access to your account with that external service . This can cause all sorts of seriously destructive problems, such as: people sending unauthorized emails that seem to be coming from YOU; theft of all of your data from these 3rd-party services; outrageously expensive fees (potentially in the thousands of dollars) when these other services charge “you“ for using their services; complete loss of all your data that is stored at these external services.
When sharing a block using the new block sharing feature (which is currently in beta), users have access to all data in all tables.
Uploaded attachments are always publicly visible at their URL, with no additional security preventing them from being seen. If someone has the URL, they can view the attachment. No logins or authentication required.
Uploaded attachments, even after being deleted from Airtable, are always visible to the general public by their URL. Any unauthorized users who have the URL can access the attachment. The worst part about this is that even if you completely delete the attachments from your system, they are still accessible to the general public. (More details in this thread .)
The solution for numbers 1-7 is to use Stacker instead of Airtable as your user interface. Stacker also adds on tons of other amazing security features as well, such as only allowing people to see the records that you authorize them to see!
However, Stacker can not fix 8 & 9.
As a professional Airtable consultant and developer, Stacker is what many of business clients are using with Airtable.